Points, particles, and structural realism by Pooley, Oliver
Points, particles, and structural realism
Oliver Pooley
Oriel College, University of Oxford
First dra : 30 July 2004;
this dra : 12 December 2005
Even if we are able to decide on a canonical formulation of our
theory, there is the further problem of metaphysical underdetermina-
tion with respect to, for example, whether the entities postulated by a
theory are individuals or not. . .
We need to recognise the failure of our best theories to determine
even themost fundamental ontological characteristic of the purported
entities they feature. . .What is required is a shi to a dierent ontologi-
cal basis altogether, one for which questions of individuality simply do
not arise. Perhaps we should view the individuals and nonindividuals
packages, like particle and eld pictures, as dierent representations of
the same structure. ¿ere is an analogy here with the debate about
substantivalism in general relativity. (Ladyman 1998)
In his paper “What is Structural Realism?” (1998) James Ladyman drew a dis-
tinction between epistemological structural realism (ESR) andmetaphysical (or on-
tic) structural realism (OSR). In recent years this distinction has set much of the
agenda for philosophers of science interested in scientic realism. It has also led
to the emergence of a related discussion in the philosophy of physics that con-
cerns the alleged diculties of interpreting general relativity that revolve around
the question of the ontological status of spacetime points. Ladyman drew a sugges-
tive analogy between the perennial debate between substantivalist and relationalist
interpretations of spacetime on the one hand, and the debate about whether quan-
tum mechanics treats identical particles as individuals or as ‘non-individuals’ on
A version of this paper will appear in Rickles, French and Saatsi (eds), ¿e Structural Foun-
dations of Quantum Gravity, Oxford University Press. Please quote from and cite the published
version.
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the other. In both cases, Ladyman’s suggestion is that a structural realist interpreta-
tion of the physics—in particular, an ontic structural realism—might be just what’s
needed to overcome the stalemate. ¿e purported analogy between the physics of
spacetime points and the physics of quantum particles has been further articulated
and defended by Stachel (2002), by Saunders (2003) and by French and Rickles
(2003).
¿e main thesis of this paper is that, whatever the interpretative diculties of
generally covariant spacetime physics are, they do not support or suggest structural
realism. In particular, I hope to show that there is in fact no analogy that supports a
similar interpretation of the metaphysics of spacetime points and of quantum par-
ticles. But the story is not simple, and a certain amount of stage setting is required.
1 What is Structural Realism?
¿egenesis of contemporary structural realism is well-known: JohnWorrall (1989)
proposed a realist interpretation of science with the intention of doing justice to
two opposing arguments. On the one hand there is the ‘no miracles’ argument:
the empirical success of science is held to be miraculous unless it has succeeded in
correctly describing the reality behind the phenomena it saves. On the other hand,
there is the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’, most famously, and forcefully, put by Lau-
dan (1981): theories that have been superseded in Kuhnian scientic revolutions
are now judged to be radically mistaken in their claims about the reality behind
the phenomena, and this despite their o en having enjoyed exceptional empirical
success. It is only rational, therefore, to expect our current theories to suer a simi-
lar fate come the next scientic revolution. Worrall’s structural realism is designed
to be realist enough so as to do justice to the ‘no miracles’ intuition and yet agnos-
tic enough to avoid falling prey to the pessimistic meta-induction. In particular,
continuity through theory change at the level of form or structure is supposed to
license the belief that science is succeeding in characterizing the structure of real-
ity (and hence its empirical success is not miraculous) even if science is radically
wrong in its description of the fundamental nature of reality.
Ladyman asked whether this is epistemology or metaphysics. If it is epistemol-
ogy, he argued, then there are problems if the doctrine is cashed out in the most
obvious way, in terms of a theory’s Ramsey sentence. Epistemological structural re-
alists, like John Worrall and Elie Zahar, have since explicitly endorsed the Ramsey
sentence strategy, and have sought to defend it against Ladyman’s objections.
Recall that the Ramsey sentenceT of a theory T is formed from T by replacing
all the theoretical predicates that occur in the theory with predicate variables and
then existentially quantifying. ¿e epistemological structural realist holds that the
cognitive content of a theory is fully captured by its Ramsey sentence. Two, related,
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results appear to pose a problem for such a position.
¿e implications of the rst for structural realism were raised against Russell’s
structuralist position by Newman (1928); they have been discussed in the context
of the recent debate by Demopoulos and Friedman (1985). Essentially the same re-
sult lies at the heart of Putnam’s paradox. ¿e problem is that it is theorem of set
theory and second-order logic that any consistent proposition to the eect that a
certain set of properties and relations exist, no matter what structural constraints
are placed upon this set, will be true of any domain, provided that the domain
has the right cardinality (and the upward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem entails that
the only cardinality constraint concerns whether or not the domain is nite). ¿e
second result is due to Jane English (1973): any two Ramsey sentences that are in-
compatible cannot have all of their observational consequences in common. ¿e
conclusion to be drawn appears to be that if a Ramsey sentence is empirically ade-
quate, then it is true. It doesn’t really make substantive claims about the structure
of reality beyond the phenomena since such claims, because they are made only in
terms of existential quantication, will always be true (providing that the realm of
the unobservable has the right cardinality).
Worrall and Zahar’s response (2001) is to stress that the Ramsey sentence is
formed by replacing only the theoretical predicates with variables; the observational
predicates remain in place. But it is far from clear that this solves the problem. It
certainlymeans that a consistent Ramsey sentence doesn’t simplymake a statement
about the cardinality of the set of individuals in the world; it does have empirical
consequences. But, putting aside Newman’s specic target in Russell, the charge
was never that structural realism conceived in terms of a theory’s Ramsey sentence
made only trivial claims about the world. ¿e charge is that it collapses into empiri-
cism; that the realist claim that science is in some way latching onto reality beyond
the phenomena so as to do justice to the ‘no miracles’ intuition has been lost.1
In fact, in further articulating their response,Worrall andZahar face a dilemma.
¿ey rely on a distinction between observational and theoretical predicates, but let
us ask how this might relate to a distinction between (directly) observable and un-
observable, or inferred, entities. Grant such a partition of the domain of the world,
and one has two possibilities: (1) an observational predicate is one that is satised
only by observable entities or (2) observational predicates can be satised by unob-
servable entities.2 If one opts for (1), then clearly the Newman problem applies in
full force to the question of which unobservable entities fall in the extensions of the
theoretical predicates. If one opts for (2), then one can ask with what right does the
structural realist claim to be able to keep xed the extensions of the observational
1For a careful defence of the claim that the truth of a theory’s Ramsey sentence is equivalent
to the combination of its empirical adequacy together with a cardinality constraint, see Ketland
(2004).
2¿e phenomenalistic strain in Zahar’s philosophy might suggest that he is committed to (1).
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predicates, given that such predicates apply to unobserved entities whose existence
is conjectural.
And even if we grant that the extensions of the observational predicates are
to be held xed, and that there is no subdomain of the world to which none of
them apply, the structural realist is still not entitled to assume that holding true
the Ramsey sentence will give a x on the extensions of the theoretical properties
and relations over which it quanties that is sucient to satisfy realist intuitions. A
complete xwill be achieved if the original theory is categorical—if all of itsmodels
are isomorphic—but (formalizations of) real scientic theories, even together with
reports of all relevant empirical data, will not, of course, be categorical.
In fact, Worrall and Zahar seem to be prepared to acknowledge that there is no
more to the content of a Ramsey sentence than all of its consequences that con-
tain only observational predicates. ¿e reason why they do not consider that this
means that their version of structural realism collapses into empiricism is that they
distinguish between a theory’s observational content—which they claim must be
empirically decidable, if it is to count as genuinely observational—and the more
inclusive set that also includes all of the empirical generalizations that the theory
entails. ¿ey concede that the theory’s Ramsey sentence itself might be amongst
the latter. But even if to endorse empirical generalizations really is to “go against
the canons of even the most liberal version of empiricism” (2003, p. 241), by itself
it hardly amounts to scientic realism, structural or otherwise.3
Let me conclude this discussion of the problems facing epistemological struc-
tural realism bymentioning one further worry. It is clear that the Ramsifying struc-
tural realist has to tread a very ne line. ¿e Ramsey sentence must be held to give
us enough of a x on the extensions of theoretical predicates so as to avoid the
Newman problem. But to achieve too strong a x would undermine the original
motivation for structural realism. ¿e reason is that the Ramsey sentence refers to,
and quanties over, exactly the same entities as the original theory. As French and
Ladyman press:
If themeta-induction is a problem about lack of continuity of reference
then Ramsifying a theory does not address the problem at all. (2003,
p. 33)
3Although it is perhaps close to the version of structural realism that I take Ladyman, in particu-
lar, to advocate. ¿is has no use for a notion of reality ‘behind’ the phenomena and involves only the
‘minimal metaphysical commitment’ to “mind independent modal relations between phenomena
(both possible and actual)” (2003, p. 46). Where Ladyman would dier from Worrall and Zahar,
presumably, is in claiming that these modal relations are not “supervenient on the properties of
unobservable objects and the external relations between them, rather this structure is ontologically
basic” (ibid., p. 46; cf. also Ladyman 1998, p. 418).
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2 Underdetermination.
¿e idea of an ontic structural realism can provoke a denite sense of unease, for
it hard not to worry that something akin to mystery mongering is taking place. It
is one thing to claim that our knowledge of the unobservable realm is limited to
structural knowledge, that all we can know about unobservable objects are their
structural properties. It is quite another thing to claim that all there is beyond the
phenomena is structure. What can this claimmean?
It would, however, be quite unfair to accuse the most prominent defenders of
ontic structural realism of mystery mongering. In order to get beyond the slogans
and metaphors and to arrive at a characterization of, if not ontic structural realism
itself, then of one of its expected achievements, it is time to consider the prob-
lem of underdetermination. ¿is problem is central to Ladyman’s positive case for
OSR: whatever else it is, OSR is intended to dissolve various metaphysical disputes
centring on underdetermination. It is supposed to provide a newmetaphysical per-
spectivewith respect towhich certain troublesome, apparently irresolvable, choices
simply do not arise.
Ladyman distinguishes between two quite distinct ways inwhich a single theory
might be said to be empirically underdetermined.4 ¿e rst type arises due to the
existence of dierent formulations of a single theory, formulations that can suggest
radically dierent ontologies if interpreted realistically. ¿is particular problem
for the realist was stressed by Jones (1991). Call the type of underdetermination
involved Jones underdetermination. Ladyman calls the second type of underdeter-
minationmetaphysical underdetermination. Roughly speaking, this type of under-
determination arises because of the existence of alternative (realist) interpretations
of a single formulation of a theory, interpretations that again are supposed to in-
volve radically incompatible ontologies. According to Ladyman the underdeter-
mination between individual and non-individual interpretations of the quantum
mechanics of identical particles, and between substantivalism and relationalism is
of this type. Another nice example is the underdetermination between two rival
4Traditional ‘underdetermination of a theory by data’ might be thought to involve two quite
distinct theories which are nevertheless empirically equivalent, either with respect to all the obser-
vational evidence so far (weak underdetermination), or in principle (strong underdetermination).
¿e types of underdetermination that Ladyman highlights, as will been seen, involve the interpre-
tation of a single theory. In what follows I simply set aside the traditional problem, and use the term
empirical underdetermination as a general term for the two special types of underdetermination that
Ladyman discusses.
Note that the division is not quite as clear cut as this summary suggests. Someone might argue,
on the basis of an instance of strong traditional underdetermination that in fact we have two formu-
lations of a single theory, not two theories. Conversely, someone might argue that Jones underde-
termination (dened below) really shows us that what we were inclined to treat as two formulations
of a single theory should in fact be regarded as two theories.
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conceptions of elds. Fields can be viewed either as substantival entities in their
own right, with innitely many degrees of freedom associated with their innitely
many point-like parts, or they can be viewed as consisting in the instantiation of a
pattern of properties by spacetime points.
It is useful at this point to mention a parallel problem in the philosophy of
mathematics. In ‘What Numbers Could Not Be’ (1965), Benacerraf highlighted the
following diculty facing anyone who would identify numbers with sets: there are
many proposals, they are incompatible so at most one can be correct, but it seems
that no cogent reason can be given for preferring one over another. If numbers are
sets then which sets they are seems to be underdetermined. Defenders of struc-
turalist views of mathematics view this diculty that faces those who would take
the reducibility of arithmetic to set theory as disclosing that numbers are really sets
as one of the best supports for their philosophy. What all the set-theoretic con-
structions share is the same structure, and this structure is all that matters. Does
this parallel reect favourably on the ontic structural realist’s attitude to empirical
underdetermination?5
For cases of empirical underdetermination to support ontic structural realism,
Ladyman had better be correct in saying that traditional realism goes beyond a
commitment to structure precisely in terms of metaphysical commitments that are
underdetermined by the evidence for them (Ladyman 1998, p. 418). On the face of
it, and without being told what a commitment only to structure might involve, the
claim does not look plausible. An obvious problem is that, on the most straightfor-
ward characterizations of structure (e.g. a set-theoretic one), most cases of dier-
ent formulations of a theory will involve dierent structures.6 Consider a model of
a theory of Newtonian gravitation formulated using an action-at-a-distance force
and an empirically equivalent model of the Newton-Cartan formulation of theory.
¿ere is no (primitive) element of the second model which is structurally isomor-
phic to the at inertial connection of the rst model, and there are no (primitive)
elements of the rst model which are structurally isomorphic to the gravitational
potential eld, or the non-at inertial structure of the second. Clearly a more so-
phisticated notion of structure is needed if it is to be something common tomodels
of both formulations of the theory.
¿e claim that the structural realist might have the resources to be able to iden-
tify something beyond the empirical that is in common to dierent formulations
of a single theory, and that he thus might be able to dissolve various interpreta-
tive problems by transcending the root underdetermination, is supposed to get
5I return to the parallel in Section 3. A crucial question will be whether the parallel supports the
elimination of objects altogether.
6A fact which undermines, I think, the parallel between empirical underdetermination (at least
of the Jones variety) and the underdetermination that motivates structuralist positions in the phi-
losophy of mathematics.
6
some of its plausibility from the case of Schrödinger’s and Heisenberg’s original
rival formulations of quantum mechanics. ¿rough the work of Weyl and others,
these formulations were soon recognised to be dierent representations of a single,
mathematical structure in which states of a system correspond to rays in a Hilbert
space, and observables correspond to operators (of the appropriate sort) that act
on this space.7 But there are at least three reasons to be sceptical that this example
alone lends support to the idea that underdetermination in general, and Ladyman’s
metaphysical underdetermination in particular, motivate a radical ontic structural
realism.
First, it is not clear that the ontic structural realist has a story to tell about this
example. As is well known, whether anyone has come up with a truly successful re-
alist interpretation—structural or otherwise—of the standard formulation of non-
relativistic quantummechanics that subsumes both Schrödinger’s andHeisenberg’s
original formalisms is a controversial issue. Two of the potential candidates—GRW
collapse theory and de Broglie–Bohm pilot wave theory—break the unifying pic-
ture by preferring one basis with respect to which either genuine collapse occurs, or
with respect to which the true beables are dened. And if more that one of the var-
ious interpretative options ultimately survives the many criticisms they all face, it
would seem that quantummechanics remains beset by underdetermination, albeit
of a very dierent type to that involving wave versus matrix mechanics.
Second, this one example gives us little reason to suppose that whatever was
achieved in this particular case will be, or even can be, repeated for other instances
of Jones underdetermination. Consider the underdetermination that exists (rela-
tive to certain solutions) between Julian Barbour’s Machian 3-space approach to
general relativity (where the fundamental ontology consists of instantaneous 3-
spaces anddoes not involve any primitive temporal notions), the traditional curved-
spacetime formulation, and formulations involving spin-2 elds on a at (or at least
xed) background spacetime. Here we have a clear case of dierent formulations of
a theory that are associated with prima facie incompatible ontologies. A structural
realist dissolution of this problem requires an explicit characterization of a math-
ematical framework that stands to each formalism as the abstract Hilbert space
formalism of quantum mechanics stands to Schrödinger’s wave mechanics and
Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics. Note that it is not enough that we have a good un-
derstanding (as we do) of the variousmathematical relationships that exist between
the formalisms. Ladyman’s structural realist needs a single, unifying framework,
which she can then interpret (in terms of an as-yet-to-be-articulated metaphysics
of structure) as corresponding more faithfully to reality than do its various realist
representations.
7In fact, Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and Schrödinger’s wave mechanics were not strictly
equivalent; see Muller (1997a, 1997b)!
7
I am not optimistic that any such development is in the ong. It seems more
likely that theoretical advances will favour one formulation over the others. String
theory’s triumph would, in many senses, vindicate the spin-2 picture. ¿e success
of loop quantum gravity (or of a variant, provided with the right sort of interpreta-
tion) could vindicate Barbour’s advocacy of 3-space concepts over spacetime con-
cepts.8 ¿e idea that underdetermination associated with dierent formulations is
to be transcended by a more general framework with respect to which the dier-
ent formulations are seen as dierent representations of a single, underlying reality
might look suspiciously like an unwarranted generalization from a single, special
case.
¿ird, the Heisenberg–Schrödinger example involves Jones underdetermina-
tion. However, the type of underdetermination that is supposed to be involved in
the debates between the substantivalist and the relationalist, and between advocates
of the “individuals interpretation” of quantum particles and those who advocates
a particles-as-non-individuals interpretation, is what Ladyman calls metaphysical
underdetermination. Here it might seem more plausible that some interpretative
stance according to which the rival viewpoints are merely dierent representations
of the same reality will be possible. (But it is important to stress that those sympa-
thetic to an ontic structural realism have yet to provide a positive characterization
of any such position, so far they have only told us what the position is meant to
achieve; see pp. 11–13 below.) But equally, one might wonder whether the underde-
termination in question is one that should genuinely trouble the realist.
In fact, a genuine underdetermination between relationalism and substantival-
ism is one that should trouble the realist. ¿is is because such an underdetermina-
tion would be an instance of Jones underdetermination. However, as things stand,
there simply is no such underdetermination. ¿e standard formulations of general
relativity are straightforwardly substantivalist in that the metric eld is (a) taken to
represent a genuine and primitive element of reality and (b) most naturally inter-
preted as representing spacetime structure.9 Now some believe that the hole argu-
ment calls this picture into question. But these same people also typically suggest
that an alternative formulation, that would correspond to a genuinely relationalist
world picture, should be sought (e.g., Earman 1989, Ch. 9). I agree that relational-
ism needs dierent physics (or at least a dierent formulation of the physics).10 But
I disagree that the formulation of GR that the realist naturally interprets along sub-
8Such discrimination between alternatives by theoretical advances gets some support from the
history of physics, although the fact that underdetermination o en reappears in a new guise means
that the realist should not take too much comfort from this state of aairs.
9¿e second of these claims is contested by some (Earman and Norton 1987; Rovelli 1997). I say
more about it below (pp. 20).
10Barbour’s 3-space approach to GR constitutes a genuinely distinct interpretation, but not a
relationalist one, since the fundamental ontology is substantival space (not spacetime).
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stantivalist lines is in trouble because of the hole argument, for there are dierent
interpretative options available within the substantivalist camp.
And it turns out that this is the true location of Ladyman’s metaphysical un-
derdetermination. ¿e opposition that he, and Stachel, characterize as between
relationalism and substantivalism is really an opposition between haecceitist and
anti-haecceitist substantivalism.11 I will explain later what I mean by these terms,
and why I believe that there is no real contest: anti-haecceitism is the clear win-
ner. But even if one thought that there was a genuine choice to be made, and that
interpreting the physics realistically failed, by itself, to make the choice, it is not
clear why this should trouble the scientic realist. For, as we will see, there is a
sense in which haecceitist substantivalism is simply an extension of anti-haecceitist
substantivalism. Anti-haecceitist substantivalism represents a realist core position
which it may or may not be correct to supplement. If this is the only choice to be
made, it hardly constitutes an interesting threat to the scientic realist’s belief in
the existence of spacetime points.
¿ings are otherwise with the quantum mechanics of identical particles. For
the benet of those already au fait with the terminology, it turns out that, while the
physics of identical particles strongly suggests anti-haecceitism, anti-haecceitism
by itself does not suce to explain all the peculiarities of the physics of quantum
particles. ¿e dierence between the two cases is traceable to a dierence in the
physics. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the way in which classical GR is dieomorphism-
invariant is rather dierent from the way in which the quantummechanics of iden-
tical particles is permutation-invariant.
¿e disanalogy highlights a sense in which it is misleading to present the quan-
tummechanical case as an instance of underdetermination between two realist in-
terpretations, if the intended implication is that the two interpretations are equally
viable. While French (1989; French and Redhead 1988) may have clearly demon-
strated that the individuals interpretation of QM particles exists in logical space,
it is not really a serious contender.12 Equally, the non-individuals interpretation,
if it truly accommodates the phenomena, is a more radical position than anti-
haecceitist substantivalism.13
11¿e positions have been labelled straightforward and sophisticated substantivalism by Belot
and Earman (1999; 2001).
12Ladyman’s claim that there is “much dispute about whether or not quantum particles. . . are
individuals” (1998, p. 419) is unconvincing if to treat particles as individuals is to adopt the inter-
pretative option delineated by French, and French and Redhead. I am not, of course, denying that
exactly how one should conceive of quantumparticles is a highly disputed question; rather I am only
claiming that there is a fair degree of consensus that one should not conceive of quantum particles
in certain ways. French (1998, p. 112, fn. 62) himself states that it’s not true that “anything goes,” but
I understand him to take viewing the particle labels of the standard tensor product Hilbert space
formalism as naming individuals as a genuine interpretative option. I don’t believe it is.
13As Teller’s discussion in his (2001) makes clear. As will become apparent, although I agree with
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In the next section I briey consider how far OSR’s defenders have gone in at-
tempting to characterize the position. Before doing so, I wish to raise two worries
connected specically to underdetermination. ¿e rst is that one might worry
that dissolving the underdetermination is not desirable. Recall that I mentioned
above the way in which the various alternative formulations of GR were linked to
quite distinct attempts to advance beyond that theory. Having these alternatives in
play might therefore serve a vital heuristic role in theoretical advance. Of course,
from the perspective of OSR, the various formulations still exist; they are just now
understood as dierent representations of the same structure. But perhaps, for ad-
vances to take place, it is important that the dierent formulations are considered
to be genuinely distinct and exclusive alternatives. And perhaps, from the per-
spective of an advance, that the subsequently favoured alternative could be unied
with the others in a single structure will seem like a happy accident; the overarch-
ing framework will appear to have a secondary status, rather than a fundamental
one.
¿e second worry is that a radical structural metaphysics might make the un-
derdetermination worse. Assuming such a metaphysics is possible (a big assump-
tion), then if one adopts it, one will view the previous alternatives as dierent rep-
resentations of the structure that one claims is fundamental. But is the fact that
this is how it looks from the perspective of OSR, enough to commend adopting
that perspective? It seems likely that every side of the original underdetermina-
tion will be able to explain the other side’s worldview. For example, if one believes
in a dynamical spacetime connection, one can explain why things are as if space-
time were at and gravity were a universal force. But why not also expect that the
red-blooded realists will be able similarly to explain away the structural realist’s
perspective, just as GRW theory and Bohm theory can (or are supposed to be able
to) explain the success of orthodox quantum theory? ¿e defender of OSR can
perhaps wield Ockham’s razor, but the dialectical problem here, for the structural
realist, is that this is exactly the type of consideration that might also favour one
traditional realist interpretation over another. And since we do not yet have the
structural realist metaphysics, or any guarantee that such a thing is conceivable, if
we will end up having to wield Ockham’s razor in order to vindicate it, one might
wonder why one should go looking for it in the rst place.
Teller that the interpretative options that the substantivalist has in the face of the hole argument are
not applicable to the case of identical QMparticles, I dier with him both about how to characterize
the substantivalist options, and about the diculty of providing a successful realist interpretation
of the quantum mechanics of identical particles.
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3 What is Ontic Structural Realism?
If it has beenmade clear what the relation of ontic structural realism to the problem
of underdetermination is supposed to be, what has been said by way of a positive
characterization of a position that can do the job? ¿e answer is, at this stage, not
much, but in a recent paper French and Ladyman (2003) seek to further articulate
their vision of OSR.
I have alreadymentioned Ladyman’s claim that traditional realism goes beyond
commitment to structure precisely in commitments that are underdetermined by
the evidence. ¿is suggests the tactic of attempting to identify exactly which el-
ements of the realist’s metaphysics are responsible for the underdetermination.
French and Ladyman have a clear view:
¿e locus of this metaphysical underdetermination is the notion
of an object so one way of avoiding it would be to reconceptualise this
notion entirely in structural terms. ¿e metaphysical packages of in-
dividuality and non-individuality would then be viewed in a similar
way to that of particle and eld in QFT, namely as two dierent (meta-
physical) representations of the same structure. (2003, p. 37)
¿e basic point in this quote, that OSR is to oer a perspective from which
viewpoints previously taken to be alternatives are seen as representations of the
same structure, has been well rehearsed above. What is new in this quote is the
claim that an elimination (or, at least, a reconceptualization) of objects is the key.
A little later, French and Ladyman are more specic:
We regard the ontic form of SR as oering a reconceptualisation
of ontology, at the most basic metaphysical level, which eects a shi 
from objects to structures. Now, in what terms does such a reconcep-
tualisation proceed? ¿is hinges on our prior understanding of the
notion of an ‘object’ which has to do. . .with the metaphysics of indi-
viduality. Given the above metaphysical underdetermination, a form
of realism adequate to the physics needs to be constructed on the ba-
sis of an alternative ontology which replaces the notion of object-as-
individual/non-individual with that of structure in some form. (ibid.)
Before asking what we are to make of this talk of reconceptualizing objects in
terms of structures, it is worth raising the following worry. In the previous section,
a distinction was drawn between traditional and metaphysical underdetermina-
tion. ¿e present proposal appears to be addressed only to the latter type (and
then, rather specically, to that involving the quantum physics of identical parti-
cles and, more controversially, the interpretation of spacetime points). Surely the
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notion of an object, and an object’s individuality, is not the root cause of the under-
determination between, for example, spacetime formulations of GR and Machian
geometrodynamics.
Putting aside this worry, let us ask what replacing the notion of objects with
that of structure comes to. It is worth recalling the parallel with structuralist views
in mathematics. Benacerraf ’s own view was that his argument to the eect that
numbers could not be sets extended to support the conclusion that numbers could
not be objects at all. But this point of view is not shared by many contemporary
‘non-eliminative’ mathematical structuralists, who hold that one can agree that a
mathematical object is the very object that it is in virtue of its occupying its partic-
ular place in the relevant mathematical structure, without in any sense eliminating
it as a genuine object.
One version of the non-eliminative view is Stewart Shapiro’s ante rem struc-
turalism, so-called a er the analogous view concerning universals. ¿is view takes
“structures, and their places, to exist independently of whether there are any sys-
tems of objects that exemplify them” (1997, p. 9). ¿e indierence to whether there
exist objects exemplifying the structures should not be taken to suggest an indif-
ference to the existence of mathematical objects. Rather the mathematical objects
are to be understood in terms of the ‘places’ in the structures; although they enjoy
a somewhat secondary ontological status to the structures in which they are places,
their existence is not being denied.
¿e idea of the independent existence of structures suggests an obvious com-
parison, viz. with the view that physical objects are nothing but bundles of collo-
cated properties (‘bundle theory’). Most variants of such a view are held to face
the decisive objection that they entail an intolerably strong version of the principle
of the identity of indiscernibles. But if one takes relations, and the structures that
they form, seriously, one has the resources to frame a sophisticated bundle theory
that entails only a relatively weak form of the identity of indiscernibles. According
to such a view, it must always be possible to make out numerical diversity in re-
lational terms that do not presuppose identity and dierence, but this allows that
two objects may nevertheless satisfy exactly the same open sentences with just one
free individual variable.14 Is this all that French and Ladyman have in mind when
they talk of a structural reconceptualization of objects?
Although it is suggested by their quoting, apparently with approval, Cassirer’s
talk of electrons as the “ ‘points of intersection’ of certain relations”, and of entities
being ‘constituted’ in terms of relations, there are two reasons why I doubt that it is
what they intend. First, the new structural metaphysics was supposed to transcend
14¿e requisite formal treatment of identity goes back to Hilbert and Bernays (1934). It is advo-
cated by, e.g., Quine (1986, pp. 63-4), and recently has been systematically applied to issues in the
philosophy of physics by Simon Saunders (2000; 2003).
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questions of individuality/non-individuality. But the obvious interpretation of the
bundle theoretic proposals is that they do yield individuals: determinately numer-
ically distinct particulars, albeit ones whose ontological status, and individuality,
is secondary to, and dependent upon, that of properties and relations. ¿e second
reason, which is related to the rst, is that there is no reason for a bundle theo-
rist to have a problem with standard logic and set theory. Standard logic and set
theory presuppose the existence of individuals that are determinately numerically
distinct, but they do not presuppose that the individuality of these individuals is
independent of the properties and relations that predicates can express, or of the
sets that the individuals can form. And yet French and Ladyman do see standard
logic as a barrier to articulating their view:
Howcan youhave structurewithout (non-structural) objects? Here
the structuralist nds herself hamstrung by the descriptive inadequa-
cies of modern logic and set theory which retains the classical frame-
work of individual objects represented by variables and which are the
subject of predication or membership respectively (cf. Zahar (1994)).
In lieu of a more appropriate framework for structuralist metaphysics,
one has to resort to a kind of ‘spatchcock’ approach, reading the logi-
cal variables and constants asmere placeholders which allow us to dene
and describe the relevant relations which bear all the ontological weight.
(2003, p. 41)
Talk of “mere placeholders” might suggest that their view is no more radical
than the bundle theoretic suggestion, but in a later footnote they are more explicit
about what they perceive to be the inadequacies of set theory, and the current un-
availability of anything that serves the ontic structural realist’s needs:
[B]oth of these modes of representation – group theory and set
theory – presuppose distinguishable elements, which is precisely what
we take modern physics to urge us to do away with. If we are going to
take our structuralism seriously, we should therefore be appropriately
reective and come up with thorough-going structural alternatives to
group theory and set theory. . . [Krause’s attempt to construct a ‘quasi-
set theory’ (Krause 1992)] insofar as [it] is based on objects which do
not have well dened identity conditions. . . represents a formalism of
one side of our metaphysical underdetermination, rather than a struc-
turalist attempt to avoid it altogether. What is needed is the construc-
tion of a fundamental formalisation that is entirely structural; we shall
leave this to future works or future (cleverer) philosophers. (2003, p.
52; my emphasis)15
15Note that talk of ‘distinguishable elements’ is ambiguous. I stated above that standard logic and
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It is time to examine more closely whether the realist’s commitment to objects
really does lead to an objectionable form of underdetermination, as French and
Ladyman maintain.
4 Objects.
Ladyman claims that “traditional realism does involve acceptance of more than the
structural properties of theoretical entities” (1998, p. 418). ¿e realist’s additional,
metaphysical commitments are underdetermined by the empirical evidence but
are supposed to be of such interpretative importance to the realist that our best
theories fail to determine “even the most fundamental ontological characteristics
of the purported entities they feature” (ibid., pp. 419–20). What are the realist’s
additional commitments? Are they as central to a traditional realism as Ladyman
claims? Should we be troubled that facts concerning them are underdetermined by
the physics itself?
¿e problem is supposed to concern whether the fundamental entities (space-
time points or quantum particles) that the realist posits are individuals, but what is
it for an object to be an individual? ¿is is, of course, a question that has beenmuch
discussed in this context (van Fraassen 1991; French 1998; Teller 1998; French and
Rickles 2003) but I have to confess myself unhappy with the course that these dis-
cussions sometimes take, andwithmany of their presuppositions. For example, the
problem is sometimes approached by suggesting that if the objects are individuals,
then there is a limited range of options for understanding what their individuality
consists in:
(i) objects might be individuated in virtue of their possessing some sort of haec-
ceity,
(ii) the individuality of the substance or matter of an object might be held to
account for the object’s individuality,
(iii) objects might be individuated in terms of their spatiotemporal location, or
(iv) objects might be individuated in terms of the properties they possess (and
perhaps, also, the relations they stand in).16
set theory presuppose the determinate distinctness of its elements. I claim that logic and set theory
presuppose that their elements are distinguishable in no stronger sense than this. ¿e dieomor-
phism invariance of GR in no way suggests that spacetime points fail to be distinguishable elements
in this sense, but the quantumphysics of identical particles does threaten the view that fundamental
particles are numerically distinct.
16Cf. French and Rickles (2003, p. 223).
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An object would then, presumably, be a ‘non-individual’ if none of these ways of
understanding it as ‘possessing individuality’ were available.
Talk of individuality, and of individuation, in these contexts is highly obscure.
A more promising approach to the question is to focus on questions of identity
and non-identity. First, one can ask, within the context of a single situation, about
the numerical distinctness of the objects featuring in the situation. Here there are
two obvious questions: (ND1) are the objects determinately numerically distinct?
And, if they are, (ND2) what (if anything) confers, or is the ground of, this nu-
merical distinctness? Second, one can ask about the trans-situation identity and
distinctness of objects in dierent situations (for example, situations that obtain at
dierent times, or dierent counterfactual possibilities). Here some of the possible
questions are:
(TT) if an object that exists at one time is the same object as a particular object that
exists at another time, does anything account for, or ground, this identity, or
is it a primitive fact?
(TW) If an object that exists in one possible situation is the same object as an object
that exists in another possible situation does anything account for, or ground,
this identity, or is it a primitive fact?
Related to these questions is a rather more specic question:
(P) are the objects such that there can be two, genuinely distinct, situationswhich
dier solely in terms of a permutation of some of the objects involved?
When the situations in question are distinct possible worlds, (P) becomes a
question concerning haecceitism. As I will use the term, haecceitism is the position
that there are pairs of genuinely distinct possible worlds that dier solely in terms
of a permutation of some of the objects that exist in17 both possible worlds.18 Anti-
haecceitism (concerning a class of objects) is simply the denial that two possible
worlds can dier solely in terms of a permutation of objects of that type. When the
situations in question are understood as obtaining at dierent times within a single
world, (P) is not a question about haecceitism.
Now clearly one’s answers to the questions (TT) and (TW), which concern
trans-temporal and trans-possibility identity respectively, will have a bearing on
17Read ‘exist in’ in such a way that it is compatible with counterpart-theoretic approaches to
trans-world identity.
18In this I comply with a usage that is standard in much recent philosophical literature. It is due
to David Kaplan (1975), and is, e.g., explicitly followed by Lewis (1986, Ch. 4). As will become clear,
it should not be confused with a commitment to haecceities, however these are to be understood.
Of course, belief in a certain robust type of haecceity might license haecceitism in the modal sense
meant here.
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how one answers the corresponding versions of (P). If one thinks that there can be
primitive facts concerning trans-temporal, or trans-world, identity, then it seems
that one will be committed to the view that a permutation of objects is alone su-
cient to yield genuinely dierent situations of the type in question.19 ¿e converse,
however, does not hold, at least in the case of trans-temporal identity. One can hold
that the state of a system at two dierent times diers solely by a permutation of the
system’s constituent objects without holding that the objects’ trans-temporal iden-
tities are brute matters of fact, for one might think that the trans-temporal identi-
ties are determined by various trans-temporal relations that do not supervene on
the intrinsic states of the system at the two times in question. ¿e most obvious
possibility, of course, is that the identities are underwritten by the continuity of the
objects’ trajectories. It seems plausible, however, that no such relations are available
to ground haecceitistic dierences in the absence of primitive trans-world identity.
Now questions of individuality appear originally to have entered discussions of
the interpretation of many-particle quantum mechanics in terms of question (P),
though it is perhaps not totally clear whether the trans-world or trans-temporal
version was in question. Crudely put, the assumption of equiprobability together
with the answer “Yes” to (P)—states which dier solely over a permutation of the
objects involved are genuinely distinct states—yieldsMaxwell-Boltzmann statistics
(see page 37 below). Answering “No”, therefore, looks like a way of accounting for
quantum statistics. It is quite possible that all that some of the founding fathers
of quantummechanics—such as Born, Heisenberg and Pauli—meant by quantum
particles lacking individuality was that (some version of) (P) should receive a nega-
tive answer. As we will see in Section 8, denying that a permutation yields a distinct
situation is not by itself sucient to explain the full peculiarities of the quantum
mechanics of identical particles.
Let us return to the question of the metaphysical commitments of traditional,
object-positing realism. We have listed four putative accounts of individuality, (i)
to (iv), and we have reviewed a set of questions—(ND1), (ND2), (TT), (TW) and
(P)—concerning object identity. I wish to urge the following point of view: it is
sucient for a certain class of objects to qualify as individuals that (ND1) gets
answered “Yes”—that in a given situation there are facts of the matter about the
objects’ numerical distinctness. In particular, I claim that answering “No” to (P)—
especially in its modal version, does not impugn the objects’ status as genuine, sub-
stantial, individuals.
Here I disagree with Paul Teller. He is concerned to identify a minimalist sense
of haecceity that is connected with the idea that a particular subject matter (e.g.,
19In fact things are not quite so straightforward: primitive trans-world identity can perhaps be
combined with a denial of purely haecceitistic dierences if it is coupled with a strong enough
essentialism; cf.Maudlin’s response to the hole argument (1989; 1990).
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that of a particular physical theory) concerns things. I take it that an entity should
be counted as an individual just if it is a thing and has a haecceity in some properly
minimalist sense. Teller proposes three “tests” forwhether a subjectmatter includes
(minimalist) haecceities:
1. Strict identity:. . . there is a fact of the matter for two putatively distinct ob-
jects, either that they are distinct or, a er all, that they are one and the same
thing.
2. Labeling:. . . the subject matter comprises things that can be referred to with
names directly attaching to the referents; that is. . . things can be named, or
labeled, or referred to with constants where the names, labels, or constants
each pick out a unique referent, always the same on dierent occurrences
of use, and the names, labels, or constants do not function by relying on
properties of their referents.
3. Counterfactual switching:. . . the subject matter comprises things which can
be counterfactually switched, that is just in case a being A and b being B is
a distinct possible case from b being A and a being B, where A and B are
complete rosters of, respectively a’s and b’s properties in the actual world.
(1998, p. 121)
“Strict identity” corresponds to a positive answer to (ND1); “counterfactual
switching” corresponds to a positive answer to the possible worlds version of (P).
Now although Teller does not claim that the three tests are necessarily “dierent
ways of getting at the same idea” (1998, p. 122), he clearly thinks that the connec-
tions are close enough for the tests to be usefully grouped together.20 But if—as
I claim—determinate intra-situation distinctness has no implications for trans-
situation identity, then such grouping can only lead to confusion. It is only the
denial of determinate intra-situation identity and distinctness that threatens the
individuality—the genuine objecthood—of the putative entities in question. How-
ever, if questions of intra-situation distinctness and trans-situation identity are not
distinguished, one might erroneously infer non-individuality from the denial of
(primitive) trans-situation identity. Keeping the two notions distinct is crucial if
20In fact, in his (2001, p. 377), Teller claims that (3) is a consequence of (1) and (2). It is true
that (1) and (2) allow us to form descriptions which, if they both describe possibilities, describe
possibilities that involve counterfactual switching (i.e., that dier merely haecceitistically). But it
does not follow from this fact alone that such possibilities exist. Note that “labeling” will only fail
to be possible even though strict identity applies when no reference to the individuals is possible.
But even in such situations ‘reference’ via variables is possible. Compare our ability to talk about
abstract symmetrical structures, e.g., Black’s sphere world. In such cases labels or names can be
used in a generic sense, but do not refer to one, rather than the other, of the objects related by the
symmetry (cf. Teller 2001, p. 367).
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one is to understand the dierence between diculties raised by the dieomor-
phism invariance of classical GR, and by the (anti)symmetrization of the quantum
states of identical particles. In the next section we will see that the former only has
implications, via the hole argument, for trans-situation identity, whereas the latter,
at least according to some, threatens determinate numerical distinctness.
I claim that the realist, in positing objects as individuals, is committed to the
determinate intra-situation numerical distinctness of the entities posited. To posit
‘non-individual’ objects, if sense can be made of this, would be to posit a class of
entities whose numerical distinctness was somehow not determinate.21 ¿ese two
positions—the positing of a class of determinately distinct objects and the positing
of a class of non-individual objects respectively—represent core realist positions.
¿ey do not go beyond an acceptance of the ‘purely structural’ properties of the
entities in question (what properties could be more structural that the determi-
nateness or otherwise of numerical distinctness?). And to go so far, and no further,
is hardly an ‘ersatz form of realism’, but rather a realism worthy of the name.
If the phenomena covered by a particular theory reallywere indierent between
these two, radically dierent metaphysics, then one would have an interesting case
of genuine metaphysical underdetermination. Perhaps this is what we face in the
quantum mechanics of identical particles. It is inappropriate, however, to regard
the spacetime points of dieomorphism-invariant generally relativistic physics as
non-individuals in this sense; the physics simply gives us no scope to do so. In
any case, the alleged metaphysical underdetermination discussed in the previous
sections was not solely an underdetermination between these two core realist posi-
tions. Rather it concerned further metaphysical commitments to which the realist
may or may not sign up.
Of course, the realist is perfectly entitled to sign up to other metaphysical com-
mitments, and he may well endorse particular answers to questions such as (TW)
and (P). In particular, it is clear that the four ways of understanding ‘individu-
ality’, (i)–(iv), mentioned above might well be held to underwrite particular an-
swers to such questions. ¿e haecceities of (i), for example, might be thought both
to ground numerical distinctness and to underwrite haecceitistic dierences; the
properties and relations of (iv) might be thought to ground numerical distinctness
in such a way as to rule out haecceitistic dierences. A ‘bare particular’ view of
objects is a specic example of a metaphysics in line with (i), or perhaps (ii); the
sophisticated bundle theory of the last section is a specic example (though not the
only example) of a metaphysics in line with (iv).
To sum up, there are two points that I wish to make at this juncture. First any
‘underdetermination’ at this level surely should not trouble the scientic realist. It
looks as if a quite general, metaphysical debate is being played out in the context
21And some think that sense can be made of this: see Dalla Chiara et al. (1998).
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of the entities of physics. Why should the fact that these two options arise in the
context of the interpretation of, e.g., spacetime points trouble the scientic real-
ist? In this context, realism is a commitment to the existence of spacetime points,
as determinately distinct, substantial individuals. It is hardly a failure of our best
theory of them that it fails to determine whether they are bundles of properties, or
bare particulars. In fact, it is not clear that the theory is indierent to the choice,
for the hole argument shows precisely that conceiving of spacetime points as some-
thing akin to bare particulars has the unwelcome consequence of a thoroughgoing
indeterminism.
¿e second point is that it has long been recognised that the choice between
the bare particulars view (according to which relata, and their numerical diversity,
are ontologically prior to their properties and relations) and a (sophisticated) bun-
dle theory (according to which relations are ontologically ‘prior’ to, and ‘constitute’
their relata) presents us with a false dichotomy. A ‘no priority view’ seems to many
to be far more plausible than either. One can endorse the structuralist claim that
the numerical diversity of certain objects is grounded in their being situated in a
relational structure without reducing these objects to the properties and relations
themselves. Equally, and conversely, one can claim that facts of numerical diversity
are not so grounded, without going on to claim that they nevertheless are grounded
bymysterious haecceities or substrata. Instead, one can just take such facts as prim-
itive and as in need of no further metaphysical ‘explanation’. It is time to see how
these issues play out in the context of the debate concerning substantivalism.
5 Sophisticated Substantivalism.
In debates concerning the nature of spacetime, substantivalism is the simply the
view that spacetime and its pointlike parts exist as fundamental, substantial enti-
ties. ¿is realist view would appear to be what follows from a fairly literal-minded
reading of the mathematical formalism of the standard formulations of relativistic
physics. For example, the models of general relativity are typically taken to be n-
tuples of the form `M, g,ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn−2e that satisfy Einstein’s eld equations. M is
a 4-dimensional dierential manifold and g is a pseudo-Riemannian metric ten-
sor. M and g, taken together, are naturally understood as representing substantival
spacetime: the elements ofM represent spacetime points, and g encodes the spatio-
temporal relations in which they stand. ¿e elds ϕi represent thematerial content
of spacetime.
¿is simple story is supposed to be threatened by Einstein’s hole argument. In
its modern guise, which it owes to Stachel and to Earman and Norton, it points
out that ifM1 = `M, g,ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn−2e is a model of a generally relativistic theory,
then the theory’s dieomorphism invariance entails thatM2 = `M,dg,dϕ1, . . . ,
19
dϕn−2e is also a model, for any dieomorphism d (dg etc. are the pull-backs and
push-forwards of the original elds under the action of the d). According to the ar-
gument, the substantivalist is committed to the view thatM1 andM2 represent dis-
tinct possible worlds. It is then pointed out that this commits the substantivalist to
a radical form of indeterminism. In the light of the previous section, it will be clear
that what interests us is the claim that substantivalism—viewing spacetime points
as genuine individuals—entails thatM1 andM2 represent two distinct physically
possible worlds. Before addressing this issue, however, I should briey consider
another threat to the substantivalist understanding of GR, namely that g should be
understood, not as representing spacetime structure, but as a ‘gravitational’ eld,
much like any other material eld.
Carlo Rovelli is someone who advocates such a view:
In the physical, as well as philosophical literature, it is customary
to denote the dierential manifold as well as the metric/gravitational
eld . . . as spacetime, and to denote all the other elds (and particles,
if any) as matter. But. . . [i]n general relativity, the metric/gravitational
eld has acquired most, if not all, the attributes that have character-
ized matter (as opposed to spacetime) from Descartes to Feynman: it
satises dierential equations, it carries energy and momentum, and,
in Leibnizian terms, it can act and also be acted upon, and so on.
[. . . ]
Einstein’s identication between gravitational eld and geometry
can be read in two alternative ways:
i. as the discovery that the gravitational eld is nothing but a local
distortion of spacetime geometry; or
ii. as the discovery that spacetime geometry is nothing but a mani-
festation of a particular physical eld, the gravitational eld.
¿e choice between these two points of view is amatter of taste, at least
as long as we remain within the realm of nonquantistic and nonther-
mal general relativity. I believe, however, that the rst view, which is
perhaps more traditional, tends to obscure, rather than enlighten, the
profound shi in the view of spacetime produced by general relativity.
(1997, pp. 193-4)
When seeking to decide between these two views it should also be borne in
mind that the “metric/gravitational eld” has also retained all of the attributes
that lead us to view the analogous structures in pre-GR theories as codications
of spacetime structure. ¿is point cannot be emphasized enough: there is a sense
in which the variable, dynamic metric eld g of generally relativistic theories plays
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precisely the same role as the at, non-dynamic metric η of special relativistic the-
ories. ¿e sole dierence between the two types of theory is that in one case space-
time is dynamical, and is governed by Einstein’s eld equations; in the other it is
not. So the sole attribute that g has lost is the ip-side of one of the attributes that
Rovelli claims it has gained, namely it is no longer immutable but is aected by
matter. And the substantivalist will, of course, see this as making his realism about
spacetime all the more plausible: as Rovelli says, spacetime now obeys the action–
reaction principle (Anandan and Brown 1995).
What of Rovelli’s contention that the metric of GR satises dierential equa-
tions? ¿e metric and ane structures of pre-GR theories also satisfy dierential
equations, albeit equations (such as the vanishing of the Riemann tensor) that are
not of a great deal of physical interest.
What of the claim that themetric has acquired “most, if not all” of the attributes
that might lead us to regard it as matter? Rovelli elaborates the point as follows:
Letmeput it pictorially. A strong burst of gravitationalwaves could
come from the sky and knock down the rock of Gibraltar, precisely as
a strong burst of electromagnetic radiation could. Why is the [second]
“matter” and the [rst] “space”? Why should we regard the second
burst as ontologically dierent from the [rst]? (1997, p. 193)
¿e attributes in question all arise from the fact that the metric is dynamical.
Now this certainly supports the view that the metric represents a genuine entity,
which does not enjoy an inferior ontological status to matter. But why go further
and seek to assimilate it to matter? ¿e phenomenon of gravitational waves cer-
tainly pushes one to regardwhatever is represented by themetric eld as a concrete,
substantival entity. But why can’t we interpret the potentially devastating eect of
gravitational radiation as due to ripples in the fabric of spacetime itself?
Clearly we can give very dierent accounts of the rock’s destruction by electro-
magnetic radiation and by gravitational radiation. According to the substantivalist,
the parts of the rock ofGibraltar, as part of an extended rigid body, are being contin-
ually and absolutely accelerated away from their natural free-fall motions towards
their common centre. ¿e accelerating forces are the electromagnetic forces that
account for the rock’s rigidity. When the rock is hit by a strong burst of electromag-
netic radiation, the natural motions of the parts of the rock do not (signicantly)
change. Rather the parts of the rock are dierently accelerated by forces that over-
come the counteracting forces between the parts of the rock. When the rock is hit
by gravitational radiation, however, no additional accelerative forces are applied.
Rather the natural motions are no longer towards the rock’s centre but are radically
divergent. So divergent, in fact, that the electromagnetic binding forces of the rock
are no longer sucient to accelerate the parts of the rock away from their natural
trajectories.
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¿eextent towhich themetric should be assimilated to other elds is connected
to the controversial question of whether gravitational waves, and more generally
the metric, carry energy and momentum. ¿e status of gravitational stress-energy
is an intricate topic, but the case for drawing a distinction between it and the stress-
energy ofmatter seems compelling (seeHoefer 2000a, for an extended discussion).
Scenarios where gravitational stress-energy seems most well-dened typically in-
volve island matter distributions in asymptotically at spacetime. Exactly those
cases, in other words, where the metric eld can analyzed into the at metric of
SR plus a perturbation (see Norton 2000, §3 and the references therein). It is the
perturbation, if anything, that corresponds to the “gravitational eld” and carries
energy-momentum. But Rovelli appears not to wish to view just the perturbation
as representing a material eld but instead wishes to brand the entire metric as
‘material’. Gravitational stress-energy and gravitational waves do not force such an
interpretation.
Let us grant, then, that a compelling case for regarding the metric eld as just
another material eld has not been made, and that a straightforward, spacetime
realist reading of generally relativistic theories remains viable. Our question now
is whether such a reading also supports the view that two models related by a non-
trivial dieomorphism represent distinct possibilities. It is clear that this question
is a version of the previous section’s question (P). If our two dieomorphic models,M1 andM2, are taken to represent two distinct physically possible worlds, then
they are worlds which dier solely over a permutation of the spacetime points.
¿ere is close to a consensus in the philosophical literature on Earman and
Norton’s hole argument that there is nothing anti-substantival about denying that
there can be such distinct possible worlds (Buttereld 1989a; Brighouse 1994; Ry-
nasiewicz 1994; Hoefer 1996; an exception is Maudlin 1990). Following Belot and
Earman, call any substantivalist position that denies haecceitistic dierences, and
regardsM1 andM2 as two representations of the same possible world, sophisti-
cated substantivalism.
Belot and Earman refuse to be convinced that the substantivalist can have it so
easy. ¿ey see sophisticated substantivalists’ responses either as lacking a “coher-
ent and plausible motivation”, or as indicative of the “insularity of contemporary
philosophy of space and time” (2000, p. 167).
I would argue that it is Belot andEarman’s refusal to take seriously the responses
that they criticize which lacks a coherent and plausible motivation. In particular,
their concern is that philosophers of physics appear to have cut themselves o from
what physicists working in the area view as genuine conceptual problems. But the
philosophers’ defence of substantivalism, and their rejection of the dilemma posed
by the hole argument, is not incompatible with taking seriously the concerns of
working physicists. On closer scrutiny, and despite the lip service some physicists
pay to it, the hole argument, and the debate between substantivalism and relation-
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alism, turns out to have rather little to do with the issues of concern to physicists.
To insist on reading the issue of substantivalism into these interpretative questions
can only lead to confusion.
Two prime examples of physicists’ concerns are (i) the notion of a background
independent theory and (ii) whether a theory’s observables should be dieomor-
phism invariant.
Concerning (i), note that background independence has to do with whether
a theory posits non-dynamical, absolute (background) elds, not with whether it
sanctions haecceitistic dierences. ¿is feature of a theory has nothing to do with
the hole argument, as Earman and Norton’s application of that argument to ‘lo-
cal spacetime’ formulations of background-dependent pre-GR theories illustrates
(1987, pp. 517–8).22 However, it may well be connected to whether the appropri-
ate Hamiltonian formulation of the theory is a constrained Hamiltonian theory for
which the dieomorphism group is a gauge group in a technical sense.23
Concerning (ii), the question ofwhether a theory’s observables are dieomorph-
ism-invariant needs further explication.24 If it is taken to entail that no physical
magnitude can take dierent values at dierent times (a version of the so-called
‘problem of time’), then it is a stronger claim than the anti-haecceitistic claim that
all dieomorphic models represent the same physical situation.
Sophisticated substantivalism may be compatible with taking seriously physi-
cists concerns, but does it have a coherent motivation? ¿e obvious thing to be
said for the position is that one thereby avoids the indeterminism of the hole argu-
ment. ¿is motivation is, of course, rather ad hoc. A less ad hocmotivation would
involve a metaphysics of individual substances that does not sanction haecceitistic
dierences, perhaps because the individuals are individuated by—their numerical
distinctness is grounded by—their positions in a structure. In the next section we
will see that Stachel has recently sought to embed his response to the hole argu-
ment in exactly this type of more general framework. I hope enough has been said
in this section and the previous one to indicate the coherence of such a point of
view; it is perhaps a modest structuralism about spacetime points, but it is a far cry
from the objectless ontology of the ontic structural realist.
¿ere is one nal line of defence of sophisticated substantivalism that needs
to be undertaken. One might concede that in principle anti-haecceitism is com-
22Of course, it becomes a moot question whether the elds representing spacetime structure
should count as ‘non-dynamical’ background elds in the context of local spacetime formulations
of pre-GR theories. In one sense they are dynamical, since they are held to obey eld equations such
as Rabcd = 0. In another sense, they are non-dynamical, since they do not vary (except globally) from
model to model.
23See Earman (2003, pp. 151–3); I hope to return to this topic on a future occasion.
24Consider, for example, Smolin’s distinction between “causal observables” and “Hamiltonian
constraint observables” in (2000b).
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patible with spacetime points being substances, but nevertheless believe that the
theoretical treatment of spacetime, read literally, strongly supports haecceitism.
Is it not the case that the natural reading ofM1 = `M, g,ϕ1, . . .ϕn−2e andM2 =`M,dg,dϕ1, . . .dϕn−2e interprets each point ofM as representing the very same
point in each model, and therefore interprets the two models as attributing dier-
ent properties to each point? Moreover, doesn’t the mathematics of GR presuppose
that the numerical distinctness of the points ofM is independent of the properties
and relations assigned to them by the elds g, ϕi? So if we’re being literalistic real-
ists about our theories, shouldn’t we take a similar stance towards the individuality
of spacetime points?
Something like this line of thoughtmightwell be responsible forwhat resistance
there remains to sophisticated substantivalism’s combination of anti-haecceitism
and realism about spacetime points. But it does not stand up to scrutiny. For a start,
it is not obvious that the numerical distinctness of the points of the mathematical
object M is independent of their properties and relations. We have already had
reason to consider structuralist approaches to mathematical objects. According to
the mathematical structuralist, the individuality of the points ofM does depend on
their positions in the mathematical structure of which they are part. ¿e mathe-
matical structuralist, of course, needs to be able to give an account of the dierence
between the two modelsM1 andM2. Here the most obvious strategy is to point
out that such a dierence can bemade out if the two are considered as distinct sub-
structures embedded in a larger structure (cf. Parsons 2004, pp. 68–9). (And if this
line is taken, there is no reason, of course, to think that the substantivalist should
postulate a counterpart in concrete reality of this larger (unspecied!) structure.)
If one remains attracted to these particular lines of haecceitist argument, a use-
ful question to ask oneself is the following. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that
the sophisticated substantivalist is right: individual spacetime points exist as basic
objects, but possible spacetimes correspond to equivalence classes of dieomorphic
models of GR. How should the formalism of GR bemodied to take account of the
anti-haecceitism? (Note that this is not the demand for a relationalist reformula-
tion that does away with spacetime points.) It should be clear that no such thing is
needed. As soon as one is committed to the existence of a set of points with various
geometrical properties, even if one is avowedly anti-haecceitistic, the most obvious
way of representing such a set will be open to a haecceitistic misinterpretation.
In fact, the haecceitist substantivalist’s mistake is a specic instance of a com-
mon type. Back in 1967, Kaplan identied the occurrence of essentially the same
error in a rather dierent context:
the use of models as representatives of possible worlds has become
so natural for logicians that they sometimes take seriously what are
really only artifacts of the model. In particular, they are led almost un-
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consciously to adopt a bare particular metaphysics. Why? Because the
model so nicely separates the bare particular from its clothing. ¿e el-
ements of the universe of discourse of amodel have an existence which
is quite independent of whatever properties themodel happens to tack
onto them. (p. 97)
It seems that the use of mathematical models as representatives of possible
worlds has become so natural for some philosophers of physics that they too have
been led almost unconsciously to endorse haecceitistic distinctions that are really
only artifacts of the model.
6 Stachel’s Generalized Hole Argument for Sets.
According to John Stachel, themoral of the hole argument is that dieomorphically-
relatedmathematical solutions to the eld equations ofGR (herea er: dieomorphs)
do not represent physically distinct solutions. Although, in the past, he has re-
ferred to his position as a relationalist one, it is really, as I use the terms, a version
of sophisticated substantivalism. He does not believe that to count dieomorphs
as representing the same physical solution one has to eliminate spacetime points.25
According to Stachel, one would be forced to view dieomorphs as representing
distinct physical solutions if one took spacetime points to be “individuated inde-
pendently of the metric eld”. One can maintain the existence of points and count
dieomorphs as representing the same physical solution if one assumes that “the
points of the manifold are not individuated independently of the gµν eld; i.e., that
these points inherit all their chronogeometrical (and inertiogravitational) proper-
ties and relations from that eld” (Stachel 2002, p. 233).26
25He does refer to bre bundle formulations of theories in which one ‘eliminates’ an indepen-
dently specied base space, replacing it with the quotient space of the total space by the bres. With
the theory so formulated, one cannot permute the bres of the total space without thereby per-
muting the points of the base space. But this does not mean, as Stachel claims, that one cannot
even generate the models that provide the basis of the original hole dilemma. Twomodels the cross
sections of which are related by a bre-preserving dieomorphism of the total space still represent
mathematically distinct objects. Further, since such cross sections are ‘dierently placed’ relative
to the bres, and since the base space is simply dened as the quotient space of the total space by
the bres, these two models represent two distributions of structurally identical elds ‘dierently
placed’ on the base space (i.e. spacetime). Of course, Stachel deems all cross sections related by
bre-preserving dieomorphisms of the total space to be physically equivalent. I agree. But we
can, with as much right, make the analogous claim of the models of the traditional formulation of
the theory. Consideration of formulations in terms of bred manifolds without an independently
specied base space gains us nothing.
26In my view there is something at least misleading about talk of the points ‘inheriting’ their
properties from this ‘eld’. It suggests that the eld is some entity in its own right (the ‘gravitational
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So far I am in agreement with Stachel. ¿e talk of the points being ‘individu-
ated’ is a little obscure. At one point Stachel talks equivalently of an entity being
‘distinguishable’ from entities of the same kind (p. 236). “Distinguishable” can be
understood in an epistemological or an ontological sense. It must be the latter that
is in question, and I suggest that, minimally, it is the entities’ determinate numerical
distinctness that is at stake (recall questions (ND1) and (ND2) from section 4). In
claiming that points are not individuated independently of the metric eld, Stachel
can be understood as claiming that their determinate distinctness fromone another
is grounded in their standing in the spatio-temporal relations to one another that
they do. ¿is in turn is held to prevent our interpreting dieomorphically-related
models as representing two situations involving the very same points as occupying
dierent positions in the very same network of spatio-temporal relations.
Now Stachel wishes to situate the hole argument, and its moral concerning the
individuation of spacetime points, in a more general framework. Rather than con-
sidering only sets of spacetime points, he considers an arbitrary set S of n entities.
And rather than considering the spatio-temporal properties encoded by gµν, he
considers an arbitrary ensemble R of n-place relations.2728 Stachel calls the rela-
tional structure `S,Re a “world”. What can be said about the ‘individuation’ of the
elements of S? Stachel suggests that there are two possibilities (within which he
draws further divisions, which I will ignore for now):
1. the entities are individuated (that is, [are] distinguishable from other entities
of the same kind) prior to and without reference to the relations R. . .
2. the entities are not individuated (that is are indistinguishable among them-
selves) without reference to the relations R. (2002, p. 236)
Later Stachel goes on to adapt terminology he borrows fromMarx, and dubs enti-
ties of kind (2) reexively dened entities.
Now dieomorphisms are simply a special class of permutations of the set of
manifold points, those that preserve the manifold’s topological and dierential
eld’). My preferred view, as explained in the previous section, is that the mathematical metric eld
is simply a specication of the points’ (spatio-temporal) properties. It does not represent something
that bestows or engenders the points’ properties. It stands to the points as, e.g., red stands to red
things (however that is!).
27In what follows I adopt as far as possible Stachel’s convention of using boldface type when
referring to sets, italic type when referring to n-tuples (and to numbers), and roman type when
referring to elements of sets or of n-tuples.
28One might consider relations of any adicity. For any adicity N < n, Stachel claims that the
restriction to n-place relations is no real restriction because there is a natural way of associating an
n-place relation with any N-place relation. Assuming I have understood his description correctly,
the procedure that Stachel outlines will associate a single n-place relationwith some pairs of distinct
relations (of dierent adicity). I do not claim that this conation causes problems for Stachel.
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structure. And just as one can start with a given model `M, g,ϕie and consider
the mathematically distinct model `M,dg,dϕie generated by the action on the
elds induced by a particular dieomorphism d, one can start with `S,Re and con-
sider a new structure `S,PRe generated by the action on theM relations R1, . . .RM
in R induced by an arbitrary permutation P  S   S. ¿e denition of PRi > PR is
obvious: (taking an n-place relation to be dened extensively as a set of n-tuples
of elements of S, i.e. as a subset of Sn) for any s = `s1, . . . , sne > Sn, s > PRi just if
P−1s = `P−1(s1), . . . ,P−1(sn)e > Ri.
By analogywith the interpretative questions that arise in connectionwith `M, g,
ϕie and `M,dg,dϕie, one might consider whether the structure `S,Re’s being a
possible world entailed that `S,PRe is also a possible world. And, if both are held to
be possible worlds, onemight consider whether `S,Re and `S,PRe should be inter-
preted as the same, or as distinct possible worlds. Of course, `S,Re and `S,PRewill,
in general,29 not be identical, just as `M, g,ϕie and `M,dg,dϕie are, in general,
distinct mathematical entities. If we wish nonetheless to talk of their ‘being’ the
same possible world, then a distinction needs to be drawn between the structures`S,Re and `S,PRe, considered as mathematical objects, and the possible worlds
they represent. Our second question then becomes whether `S,Re and `S,PRe
represent the same, or dierent, possible worlds.30
Stachel talks of permutable and generally permutableworlds, theories, and even
entities. Although this is not how Stachel denes the terms, I propose the following
denitions. ¿e structure `S,Re is a permutable world just if, if it represents a pos-
sible world then `S,PRe also represents a possible world, for every permutation P.
¿e structure `S,Re is a generally permutable world just if, if it represents a possible
world then `S,PRe represents the same possible world, for every permutation P.
With one minor qualication, I can follow Stachel in his denition of a theory and
of a permutable theory:
A theory is a “rule that picks out a class of worlds: in other words, a
class of ensembles of n-place relations: R,R′,R′′, etc., whose places
are lled by the members of the same set S of n entities a; further, let
it be a permutable theory . . . [just in case], if R is in the selected class
of worlds, so is PR for all P. (2002, p. 244)31
29¿e qualication concerns the case when all of the relations in R are symmetric with respect
to all permutations of S (i.e., if for any Ri, s > Ri just if Ps > Ri,∀P), a case that will be important in
the context of quantum particles.
30A way of talking that Stachel quickly slips into.
31My reservation concerns talk of a relation’s ‘places’ being ‘lled’ by the members of some set.
If we are conceiving of relations on a given domain in purely extensional terms (cf. Stachel 2002,
p. 237), then strictly it makes no sense to talk of a xed relation as having places that might be
variously lled.
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Despite their status as the analogues of dieomorphic models of GR, Stachel
nowhere explicitly considers two distinct structures such as `S,Re and `S,PRe. In-
stead he seeks to dene things in terms of expressions of the form “Ri(a) holds”
and “R(a) holds”.32
Now the claim that Ri(a) holds is simply the claim that a > Ri (recall that
a is a particular n-tuple and that we are considering only n-place relations). But
what does “R(a) holds” mean? ¿e obvious interpretation is that a > Ri for all
Ri > R.33 But note that, for generic sets S and ensembles of relations R, there will
be no sequence a > Sn such that R(a) holds!34
¿is might lead one to suspect that Stachel’s attempts to dene the ensemble of
relationsPR, and his notion of a permutable world, in terms of the expressionR(a)
are doomed, and indeed they are. PR is said to hold for a if and only if R(P−1a)
holds. Stachel is not explicit about whether this is required for every a, but either
way the denition is not equivalent to the (more standard) denition of PR given
above. For consider, as an example, S = s1, s2,R = R1 = `s1, s1e,R2 = `s2, s2e
andR′ = R′1 = `s1, s1e,R′2 = `s1, s2e. Now `S,Re and `S,R′e are non-isomorphic
structures, but because neither R(a) nor R′(a) holds for any ordered pair a of el-
ements of S, R(a) holds i R(P−1a) holds.35
Stachel’s denition of a permutable world is equally problematic. `S,Re is said
to be permutable if, whenever R(a) is a possible state of the world, then PR(a) is
also a possible state of the world, for every n! permutations P of a.36 In the light of
32Note that, as is standard practice, Stachel here makes the letter Ri do double duty as a predicate
letter (in the expression “Ri(a)”) and as the name for the relation that is this predicate’s extension.
33For the record, Stachel’s own elucidation is that ‘R(a)’ stands for “the entire ensemble of rela-
tions lled by that sequence [i.e., by the particular n-tuple a]” (2002, p. 237)
34It will fail to hold for all a whenever R contains two disjoint relations. Rather unfortunately
for Stachel, the pair of binary relations (promoted to continuously innite relations as per Stachel’s
recipe) on a set of spacetime points expressed by the predicates “x is timelike related to y” and “x is
spacelike related to y” is just such an example of disjoint relations. It will also fail even if no relations
are disjoint, just so long as, e.g., the intersection of two relations does not intersect with a third etc.
¿ere is another oddity worth noting. Even for structures `S,Re such that R(a) (interpreted in this
way) holds, R(a) constitutes an incomplete, and very arbitrary, specication of the structure. We
are told that for this particular a, a > Ri for all Ri > R, but this tells us next to nothing about R.
To be given the complete state of the world, we need to be told, for every n-tuple, and for every Ri
individually, whether or not the n-tuple is in the relation.
35¿is will be true for every pair of ensembles of relations on the same domain such that, for
each ensemble, no n-tuple of elements of the domain is a member of every relation; the ensembles
do not even have to be equinumerous! ¿e condition “PR(a) holds i R(P−1a) holds” therefore
clearly fails to dene PR in terms of R.
36If there is a possible world in whichR(a) holds, Stachel callsR(a) a possible state of the world,
and if R(a) holds he calls it a state of the world (2002, pp. 237–8). As Stachel notes, there will only
be asmany as n! distinct permutations if a is a nonduplicating n-tuple. With what right does Stachel
consider only nonduplicating n-tuples? ¿is is an indication that he is not really interpreting “R” in
“R(a)” as expressing an ensemble of relations, extensively dened or otherwise.
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the troubles noted in the last paragraph, let us simply take `S,PRe to be the isomor-
phic structure generated by P, in the way outlined above on page 27, and consider
again the example S = s1, s2, R = R1 = `s1, s1e,R2 = `s2, s2e. Intuitively, if`S,Re is to be permutable, `S,PRe should be (should represent) a possible world.
But since R(a) and PR(a) are not states of the worlds `S,Re and `S,PRe for any a,
whether `S,Re counts as permutable will be independent of whether or not `S,PRe
also counts a possible world. One might hope that by taking the relations to be de-
ned intensively, rather than extensively, sense can be made of these denitions. A
little reection shows that this will not work either.37
¿e ensemble PR, then, simply cannot be dened in terms of R(a) in the way
Stachel suggests, however one understands R(a). In fact, the obvious denition of
PR in terms of expressions such as Ri(a) is the following:∀P,∀Ri > R and ∀a > Sn,PRi(a) i Ri(P−1a)
¿at is, it must be given in terms of the individual expressions Ri(a), not via the
single expression R(a). Why does Stachel introduce the expression R(a) at all?
It gures prominently in his set-theoretic version of the hole argument. We are
asked to consider the class of ensembles of relations R,R′,R′′ picked out by some
permutable theory, and then the question is put “Could such a permutable theory
pick out a unique state of the world by rst specifying a unique world, i.e., one R;
and then specifying how any number m of its places less than (n − 1) are lled?”
(2004, p. 244). Not if the entities in question are not reexively dened, claims
Stachel, for then, “R(a) and PR(a) represent dierent states of the world” (ibid.).
But this is just false. Whenever all the relations in R are symmetric with respect to
all permutations, we get back the identical structure (R(a) i PR(a)), so there can
be no question of their representing dierent worlds. And even setting aside the
special case of symmetric ensembles of relations, we again have the unwarranted
restriction to nonduplicating n-tuples, for otherwise there is the possibility that
R(a) and PR(a) are both states of the same structure because, although R x PR,
a = Pa.
37Stachel provides the following example to illustrate his denitions. Our set is Cat,Cherry
and R(x1,x2) holds i x1 is on a mat and x2 is on a tree. With the relation specied in this way,
one can perhaps make sense of the same relation ‘having its places lled’ by dierent n-tuples, even
when the relation does not in fact hold of the n-tuples in question (cf. 2002, p. 237). But this does
not enable us to make sense of PR(a). For consider extending the example with another relation:
R′(x1,x2) holds i x1 is red and x2 has claws. And consider the world in which the cat is on a mat
(and the cherry is not), the cherry is on a tree (and the cat is not), the cherry is red (and the cat is
not) and the cat has claws (and the cherry does not). ¿e obvious interpretation of “R(Cat,Cherry)
holds” is that the cat is on a mat and the cherry is on a tree and that the cat is red and that the
cherry has claws, i.e., the claim that R(Cat,Cherry) holds is false at the specied world, and, let us
suppose, at every possible world. And, more generally, it seems that we again we have an ensemble
R of relations for which R(a) never holds for any ordered pair a of our domain.
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I think enough has been said to show that, taken literally, Stachel’s description
of a set-theoretic hole argument is in terminal trouble. But it is equally clear how
to make precise what he must have had in mind. We need the notion of a complete
description of the structure `S,Re, and also of a partial description, for the latter will
be the analogue of a specication of a metric eld on all of a dierentiable manifold
save for a compact region (the ‘hole’ of the hole argument).38 One way of giving
such a complete description is the following. We suppose that for every relation
Ri > R we have a predicate symbol Ri (I follow Stachel in using the same letter for
the predicate and the relation it expresses). And similarly, we suppose that we have
a name ak for every element of S. A complete description will be a conjunction of
the following three formulas: (i) an (n2 M)-place conjunction that includes, for
every predicate letterRi and for every n-place sequence a of the names for elements
of S, either the formula Ri(a) or the formula  Ri(a); (ii) an n!-place conjunction(ixjai x aj) stating that dierent names name dierent elements of S; and (iii) an
n-place disjunction (∀y(ni=1 y = ai)) stating that there are no elements of S other
than a1, . . . ,ak.
Now we may introduce R(a) as an abbreviation for this conjunction, where
a is some particular non-repeating n-place sequence of the n names ak. R(P−1a)
will then be (an abbreviation of) a complete description of the (mathematically)
distinct but isomorphic structure `S,PRe, and §x1 . . .§xnR(x1, . . . ,xn) will be a
structural description true of any structure isomorphic to `S,Re.39
I suggest that it is expressions such asR(a) that Stachel needs for his hole argu-
ment for sets. Recall that he considers rst specifying a unique world R, and then
specifying how many any numberm of its places less than (n − 1) are lled. Given
the extensive conception of relation that he began with, to specify R is already to
specify, for every n-tuple, whether or not it is a member of each relation in R.40
Instead, what he should have considered was rst specifying an isomorphism class
of structures via §x1 . . .§xnR(x1, . . . ,xn), and then specifying how m ‘places’ in
this structure are lled via a formula such as §x1 . . .§x(n−m)R(b,x1, . . . ,x(n−m)),
where b is some particular non-repeating m-place sequence of the names for the
elements of S.
38In what follows I am inuenced by the notational conventions of §3 of Belot (2001), which pro-
vides an admirably clear and uncluttered account of the symmetries and permutations of abstract
structures and our means of describing them in a rst-order language. Stachel is at pains to stress
the coordinate independence of the hole argument, which might partly account for his reluctance
to engage in the necessary, though limited, semantic ascent.
39As Belot notes, no rst-order theory (i.e., no set of sentences involving only variables and no
names) can determine a structure up to isomorphism if n is innite. Correspondingly, the prescrip-
tion we are considering, which does determine the structure up to isomorphism, yields an innitary
formula, i.e. something that is not well-formed according to standard rst-order logic.
40And to give only an intensive denition of an ensemble of relations will fail to pick out a par-
ticular isomorphism class of structures at all.
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Let a = (b, c) (a is an n-place sequence of names, b is an m-place sequence of
names and c is an (n −m)-place sequence of names). If the theory we are consid-
ering is a permutable theory, then if the structure that corresponds to the descrip-
tion R(a) = R(b, c) is a possible world, so too is the structure corresponding to
the descriptionR(Pa) =R(b,P(n−m)c), i.e., we consider a permutation P that acts
non-trivially only on the last (n −m)members of the sequence a. If the elements
of S are not reexively dened (i.e., if these entities are individuated independently
of the ensemble of relations R, i.e., if `S,Re and `S,P−1Re represent distinct pos-
sible worlds), then specifying only §x1 . . .§x(n−m)R(b,x1, . . . ,x(n−m)) fails to pick
out a unique world, for it is compatible with both R(a) and R(Pa), which both
describe (distinct) structures allowed by the theory (namely, `S,Re and `S,P−1Re
respectively), structures that represent distinct possible worlds. On the other hand,
if the elements of S are reexively dened (if they are ‘generally permutable entities’
that are not individuated independently of the ensemble of relations), then specify-
ing only §x1 . . .§x(n−m)R(b,x1, . . . ,x(n−m)) is sucient to pick out a unique world
because, although compatible with bothR(a) andR(Pa), these describe only for-
mally distinct, isomorphic structures which represent the same world. It is surely
in this latter case that Stachel intends to apply the label “generally permutable” to
the theory, and to the worlds it picks out. ¿is, I submit, is the proper set-theoretic
analogue of the hole argument.41
7 Stachel on Identical Particles.
It is nally time to consider Stachel’s application of all of this to quantum particles.
I quote at length:
One can immediate apply this result to the current discussion about
the individuality of elementary particles. . .One group maintains that
each elementary particle retains its individuality, and that quantum
statistics are merely the result of the fact that certain states. . . that are
accessible to systems of elementary particles that are not of the same
kind, are for some reason inaccessible to systems of particles that are
all of the same kind. ¿e other group maintains that quantum statis-
tics has its origin in the lack of individuality of elementary particles. As
far as I know, no one has . . .mentioned the possibility of extending the
hole argument from the discussion of the individuality of space-time
41A specication of the metric on all of a manifold except a ‘hole’ (once one has solved the equa-
tions and determined the metric in the hole up to isomorphism) corresponds, in eect, to the for-
mula §x1 . . .§x(n−m)R(b,x1, . . . ,x(n−m)). I.e., one has specied an equivalence class of dieo-
morphic solutions to Einstein’s eld equations and has further specied, for all but the hole, which
manifold points have which spatio-temporal properties.
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points to the discussion of the individuality of elementary particles, as
I shall now do.
If we take the points of our set to represent n elementary parti-
cles of the same kind, then quantum-mechanical statistics imposes the
requirement that all physical relations between them be permutable.
Our set theoretical hole argument shows that, if we ascribe an indi-
viduality to the particles that is independent of the ensemble of per-
mutable relations, then no model can be uniquely specied by giv-
ing all the n-place relations R between them unless we further specify
which particle occupies each place in these relations. . . (2002, p. 245)
In a footnote he expands on what he means by “the requirement that all physical
relations between [the particles] be permutable”:
¿e relations will represent values of physical properties of the sys-
tem of identical particles, which must remain invariant under all per-
mutations of the particle labels. Since these physical properties are
represented by bilinear functions of the state vector of the system, they
will remain invariant whether the state vector remains invariant under
a permutation (bosons) or changes sign (fermions). . . (ibid., p. 261; my
emphasis)
¿e obvious interpretation of the claim that the relations between the particles
are themselves permutable is that all permutations of the set S are symmetries of
these relations. ¿at is, for every Ri, a > Sn and permutation P, a > Ri i Pa > Ri.
In this special case we have `S,Re = `S,PRe; there just can be no question of the
two structures representing distinct worlds because we do not have two structures:
there is only one. Such a situation does indeed correspond to what we nd in the
case of the quantum mechanics of identical bosons and fermions. ¿e quantum
states of such systems are required to be either symmetrized or antisymmetrized.
¿at is, for an arbitrary permutation of the particle labels, one gets back the very
same state (up to a phase factor of −1 in the case of fermions, if the permutation is
odd). Stachel’s footnote suggests that he is indeed considering such symmetrized
and antisymmetrized states. His characterization of the group who maintain that
elementary particles retain their individuality but that “certain states. . . that are ac-
cessible to systems of elementary particles that are not of the same kind, are for
some reason inaccessible to systems of particles that are all of the same kind” also
strongly suggests that he has (anti)symmetrized states in mind. Moreover, when
one talks of the “permutation invariance” of the quantum mechanics of identical
particles, one is typically referring to the fact that the physically allowed states them-
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selves are permutation invariant (up to a phase).42
But now consider how this situation plays out in the context of the set-theoretic
hole argument. First consider Stachel’s ‘states of the world’ R(a) and R(Pa). ¿ese
are indeed distinct states of the world, but for any world `S,Re allowed by quan-
tummechanics, ifR(a) is a state of this world, thenR(Pa) is also a state of the very
same world. If the relations themselves are permutable then R(a) and R(Pa) are
either both true, or both false. Consider, instead, the complete description R(a)
introduced above. IfR(a) is a description of a world allowed by quantummechan-
ics, thenR(Pa)will be a description of exactly the same world (it will be a logically
equivalent formula). ¿us stipulating that §x1 . . .§x(n−m)R(b,x1, . . . ,x(n−m)) does
suce to pick out a unique world, even if one believes that the individuality of quan-
tum particles transcends the relational structure in which they are embedded.
In fact, Stachel does not always talk as if the ensemble of relations in question is
itself permutable (i.e. that it corresponds to a symmetric or antisymmetric state).
Before applying the hole argument to quantum particles, he writes:
Some suggest that, if elementary particles are not individuated,
then any attempt to label them is misguided. On the contrary, it is
just an example of the usual method of coordinatization, introduced
when treating any set of entities that are numerous, yet indistinguis-
able. . .What is important to realize is that, in all such cases, no one
coordinatization (labelling in this case) is preferred over another; and
that it is precisely invariance of all relations under all permutations of
the labels that guarantees this. It is entirely indierent which six elec-
trons out of the universe make up a particular carbon atom[.] ¿ey
are individuated, as K-shell or L-shell electrons of the atom, for exam-
ple, entirely by the ensemble of their relations to the carbon nucleus
of the atom and to each other. Indeed, the notation for the electronic
structure of an atom is based on this type of individuation. (2002, p.
243)
Here, again, Stachel talks of the “invariance of all relations under all permutations
of the labels.” However, he also claims that one can think of, e.g., a K-shell electron
as being individuated by the ensemble of the relations that hold between the elec-
trons of the atom, and between the electrons and their nucleus. In a footnote he
elaborates: “as a result of the Pauli exclusion principle for fermions, each electron
42Strictly, this corresponds to the quantum mechanics of identical particles satisfying the sym-
metrization postulate. Sometimes ‘permutation invariance’ is used to refer the strictly weaker re-
quirement that the expectation values of all physical observables be permutation invariant (see
French and Rickles 2003, §2-3). Note that (i) the more general possibilities allowed by the weaker
interpretation do not appear to be realized in nature and that (ii) to require the permutation invari-
ance of states (up to a possible phase factor of −1) is to impose the symmetrization postulate.
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in an atom can be fully individuated by the set of its quantum numbers” (2002, p.
260). And later he claims that his set-theoretic hole argument shows that:
if we ascribe an individuality to the particles that is independent of
the ensemble of permutable relations, then no model can be uniquely
specied by giving all the n-place relations R between them unless we
further specify justwhich particles occupies each place in the relations.
For example, the rules for lling atomic shells in the ground state of
an atom with electrons would have to be regarded as radically incom-
plete, since they do not tell uswhich electron has the dierent quantum
numbers that characterize that state. (2002, pp. 245-6)
At this point, we should distinguish two, quite distinct, ways of describing,
e.g., the electrons in a particular atom. First we might give its state as an anti-
symmetrized vector in a tensor product Hilbert space. It is this description that
corresponds to an ensemble of permutable relations. And, despite what Stachel ap-
pears to suggest, one cannot think of the labels that feature in this description as
(arbitrary coordinate) labels for electrons with particular quantum numbers, indi-
viduated by the ensemble of relations. First, precisely because they are permutable,
the relations fail to individuate in the way Stachel appears to imply: every place in
the ensemble of relations is exactly like every other place.43 Secondly, and relat-
edly, in this formalism, each electron, i.e., the entities associated with each label,
enters equally into the state associated with a particular set of quantum numbers,
e.g., those corresponding to a K-shell electron with a particular spin.44 It is for this
reason that it is held by some that “attempts to label the electrons are misguided.”
It is just hard to believe that the labels in the tensor product formalism are genuine
labels (cf. Teller 1998, §5); they are certainly not an example of the “usual method
of coordinatization”.
¿e alternative description involves Fock space and the occupation number
formalism (see, e.g., van Fraassen 1991, pp. 438-48). Here no particle labels are em-
ployed at all. Rather the formalism uses occupation numbers, “numbers describing
how many times each maximal property is instantiated, with no regard to “which”
43¿is is not say that such relations cannot be held to individuate; although the relations are
permutable, they may represent, e.g., symmetric yet irreexive relations, which is enough to force
the numerosity of the domain if one adopts the Hilbert and Bernays’ denition of identity (see
Saunders 2003, esp., 294-5). We can even think of bosons as being individuated by such relations
when their symmetrized entangled state does not involve more that one copy of any single-particle
state in each element of the superposition.
44¿ese points are related to the claim that all identical particles, fermions just asmuch as bosons,
violate the identity of indiscernibles, in every physically possible state (French and Redhead 1988).
¿e claim is only true if the labels of the tensor product Hilbert space formalism are interpreted as
genuine labels.
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particle has which of the properties” (Teller 1998, p. 128). Such descriptions cor-
respond to formulae of the type §x1 . . .§xnR(x1, . . . ,xn) involving no names and
only variables. Note that the R occurring in this description will not abbreviate
the same complex relation as theR that occurs in a description of the permutable
structure corresponding to a symmetrized state vector. ¿eRs of the latter type of
description have every possible symmetry: R(a) andR(Pa) are logically equiva-
lent formulae for every P. In contrast, theR of an occupation number description
will have no symmetries: each placemust correspond to a dierent, maximal, prop-
erty.
If we now try to run the hole argument for an occupation number description
we run into trouble, for there simply is nothing in the formalism that corresponds
to further specifying which entities occupy which occupied states, e.g., the vari-
ous atomic shells in an atom. As soon as we do introduce things that formally
look like such names—the labels of the tensor product Hilbert space formalism—
we symmetrize, so that every label is associated with every occupied atomic shell.
Either way, there appears to be no analogue of the hole argument for quantum
particles. Stachel appears to conate the two descriptions: one the one hand he
talks about labels, and permutable relations (suggesting the labelled tensor prod-
uct Hilbert space formalism), on the other hand he talks about dierent electrons
being individuated by dierent sets of quantum numbers, in conformity with the
Pauli exclusion principle (suggesting an occupation number description).
I hope to have made it clear that the dieomorphism invariance of GR, and
the permutation invariance of quantum mechanics are very dierent. In the rst
case, the dieomorphism invariance is a symmetry of the theory.45 If `M, g,ϕie is
a solution to the theory, then so is (the mathematically distinct) `M,dg,dϕie.
But whether or not we take the interpretative step of regarding these twomodels as
representing the same world, arbitrary dieomorphisms are not symmetries of the
worlds they represent (except in special cases where the metric has Killing vectors,
in which case a small subgroup of the dieomorphism group will be a symmetry
group of the solution). Contrast this with case of quantum mechanics. Starting
with the tensor product Hilbert space formalism, permutations of particle labels
are symmetries of the theory. For example, ifΨ12 is a physically possible state of two
identical particles, then so isΨ21. But this is becauseΨ12 = (−)Ψ21. Permutations are
symmetries of every solution of the theory, and that is how and why they are also
symmetries of the theory. And if we consider instead the Fock space formalism,
there simply are no particle labels to be permuted.
45¿e distinction between symmetries of theories, and of worlds, is discussed by Belot (2003,
§4.2) and Ismael and van Fraassen (2003, p. 378); I am grateful to Paul Mainwood for emphasizing
it to me.
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I conclude that the dieomorphism invariance of GR and the permutation in-
variance of quantum mechanics are not formally analogous, and do not generate
the same interpretative problems concerning the individuation of the putative sub-
jectmatter of the theories. ¿is is not, of course, to say that there are no similarities.
To treat the points of the manifold of a solution of Einstein’s eld equations as akin
to variables rather than names (a stance Maudlin (1989) has dubbed ‘Ramseyfy-
ing substantivalism’), would be to regard the models of GR as akin to a Fock space
description; it involves regarding distinct mathematical models as strictly logically
equivalent and as only syntactically distinct. Conversely, if one can really think
of the states associated with the occupation numbers of the Fock space formal-
ism as genuinely occupied by objects, objects that are individuated by the properties
attributed to them by these states (cf. Stachel’s talk of electrons in an atom being
individuated by their dierent quantum numbers), then what is to stop us naming
them? Such names would not correspond to the labels of any quantum formal-
ism, but they would correspond to the informal talk of physicists, who are happy
to talk of the the K-shell electron, for example, (assuming there is only one) or of
the particle in the le -hand wing of the EPR apparatus.
In the next section I consider briey whether this talk is really permissible.
Before turning to that nal topic, let us briey consider French and Rickles’ assess-
ment of Stachel’s analogy between points and particles. ¿ey write:
Stachel. . .understands the non-individuality of particles as their
being individuated ‘entirely in terms of the relational structures inwhich
they are embedded’. . .But then it is not clear what metaphysical work
the notion of ‘non-individuality’ is doing, when we still have ‘objects’
which are represented by standard set theory (and this is precisely the
criticism that can be levelled against attempts to import non-individuality
into the spacetime context). . .
Again the alternative, ‘middle way’ is to drop objects out of the on-
tology entirely, regarding both spacetime and particles in structural
terms. Indeed, this appears to be the more appropriate way of under-
standing both Stachel’s talk of individuating objects ‘entirely in terms
of relational structures inwhich they are embedded’. . .However, rather
than thinking of objects being individuated, we suggest they should be
thought of as being structurally constituted in the rst place. In other
words, it is relational structures which are regarded as metaphysically
primary and the objects as secondary or ‘emergent’. (2003, p. 235)
In light of this section and the previous ones, the response I advocate to these sug-
gestions should be clear. Why should non-individuality do any more work than
(be anything more than) the denial of primitive individuality and haecceitistic dif-
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ferences? We have yet to be given a reason to think that standard set theory should
not apply, at least to spacetime points.
8 Identical Particles and Identity Over Time.
A simple story is o en retold in elementary discussion of quantum statistics. Sup-
pose that we have two identical particles, a and b, and just two possible single-
particle states L and R. We are told that if one ‘thinks classically’, one should expect
four distinct states for the joint system:
1. L(a)L(b)
2. L(a)R(b)
3. R(a)L(b)
4. R(a)R(b)
And if we further suppose that each of these states is equally probable, then we get
an instance of Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics: the possibility according to which
one particle is in state L while one is in state R is twice as likely as each of the two
possibilities according to which the particles are in the same state.
But quantum particles obey either Fermi–Dirac or Bose–Einstein rather than
Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics. For example, in the Bose–Einstein case, the possi-
bilities:
1. L(2)R(0): two particles are in state L
2. L(1)R(1): one particle is in state L and one particle is in state R
3. L(0)R(2): two particles are in state R
are all equally likely. It seems that it is the supposition that L(a)R(b) andR(a)L(b)
are distinct possibilities that led us to the wrong, classical, statistics. But isn’t equat-
ing the possibilities L(a)R(b) and R(a)L(b) simply anti-haecceitism? It seems
that the non-existence of haecceitistic dierences between states involving iden-
tical quantum particles suces to explain quantum statistics. Perhaps quantum
statistics recommends exactly the same interpretative move as the hole argument
in general relativity a er all.
Unfortunately, things are not so simple. First, anti-haecceitism is compatible
with Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics, as is shown by Huggett (1999b). What is re-
quired, if one is to obtain such statistics while denying haecceitistic dierences, is,
crudely put, a continuum of possible microstates relative to a countable number of
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particles (ibid., §IV). It might be held that this result is just as well, for some see the
Gibbs Paradox as motivating the denial of haecceitistic dierences even in classi-
cal statistical mechanics (see, e.g., Saunders 2003, p. 302), although this remains
a matter of controversy. ¿e dierence between quantum statistical systems, and
classical statistical systems, is then to be seen as arising precisely because, in the
quantum case, one does not have a continuum of microstates.
I agree with this as far as it goes, but it seems that a puzzle remains. Why is
the symmetrization postulate imposed; i.e., why, rather than simply stipulating
that L(a)R(b) and R(a)L(b) represent the same state, do we take the appropriate
quantum state to be (1~º2) (L(a)R(b) + R(a)L(b))?
¿e answer has to do with a distinction drawn in section 4. Statistics are man-
ifest over time in frequencies. To regard the states L(a)R(b) and R(a)L(b) as dis-
tinct in the context of the persisting particles a and b is not necessarily to sign up
to haecceitistic dierences. A single solution might involve the instantaneous state
L(1)R(1) at two dierent times t1 and t2. If it makes sense to ask whether the par-
ticle that occupies state L at t1 is the same as the particle that occupies the state L
at t2, then we have a legitimate, non-haecceitistic reason for distinguishing between
the instantaneous states L(a)R(b) and R(a)L(b). According to a point of view
that goes back at least to Reichenbach (1956), the dierence between classical and
quantum statistics bears on such questions concerning identity over time, rather
than haecceitism.
As a very simple example, consider our two one-particle states L and R, which,
let us suppose, at regular time intervals, t1, t2, . . ., are instantiated by two ‘parti-
cles’.46 Consider the two cases where the frequencies exhibited over time corre-
spond to (i) Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics and (ii) Bose–Einstein statistics. ¿e
frequencies of scenario (i) can be explained in terms of a very simple dynamical
model. It involves two persisting particles such that (a) at each time the probability
of each particle occupying each state is 12 and (b) the likelihood of their occupying
each state at each time is independent of which state the other particle occupies at
that time. Scenario (ii), on the other hand, is most simply explained by postulat-
ing that at each time the three possible instantaneous states L(2)R(0),L(0)R(2)
and L(1)R(1) are equally likely; there is no additional fact of thematter concerning
whether the ‘particle stage’ that instantiates L at one time constitutes a stage of the
same persisting particle as the particle stage that instantiates L at some other time.
Of course, one can combine such additional facts about persistence with the Bose–
Einstein statistics of scenario (ii). But if one does, the dynamics of the two particles
can no longer be independent of each other but must involve ‘causal anomalies’ if
the correct frequencies are to be recovered (Reichenbach 1956, pp. 69-71 (in Castel-
46I am indebted, at this point, to a conversation with Nick Huggett.
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lani ed.)).47
¿e previous paragraph suggests the following possibility. Perhaps one can
view the instantaneous temporal stages of quantum particles as genuine individ-
uals, individuated by their sets of quantum numbers. ¿e only problem with in-
troducing particle labels as the names of such objects is that they illicitly introduce
primitive trans-temporal identities between the particles that exist at one moment
and those that exist at another. We are forced to (anti)symmetrize the state to ‘rub
out’ out these illegitimate trans-temporal identities. ¿e entities that exist at any
given instant are not really to be thought of as each in an identical mixed state (it’s
not the case that every electron is currently equally a part of me, part of you, and
part of this page of the paper you are reading). We would then, again, have a strong
analogy between spacetime points and the fundamental ontology of identical par-
ticle quantum mechanics; both would be instantaneous entities fully individuated
by their properties and relations.
¿e problem with this suggestion is that the non-commutative algebra of ob-
servables prevents our interpreting even the instantaneous ontology of quantum
mechanics as a determinate set of reexively dened individuals. ¿e diculty is
that the choice of particular maximal properties to characterize the quantum par-
ticles is to a large extent arbitrary. Stachel states that “each electron in an atom can
be fully individuated by the set of its quantum numbers” (2002, p. 260). If these
quantum numbers are to fully individuate, then the electron’s component of spin
in some direction must be included, conventionally the ‘z’-direction. If such a set
of properties really did individuate, we should be able to talk about, e.g., the S-shell
electron whose spin in the z-direction is +ħ~2. But of course, we cannot, for if we
could, symmetry would require that we could also talk about the S-shell electron
whose spin in the x-direction is +ħ~2. And we could then ask whether the S-shell
electron whose spin in the z-direction is +ħ~2 was the same electron as the S-shell
electron whose spin in the x-direction is +ħ~2. But this last question is illegitimate.
¿ere being a fact of the matter about its answer would contravene quantum me-
chanics’ violation of Bell’s inequalities. Unlike spacetime points in classical general
47¿ere a rather interesting application of this type of example to the debate between perduran-
tists and endurantists. In response to the scenarios involving rotating homogeneousmatter that en-
durantists press against perdurantists, Sider (2001, pp. 224-36) has suggested that one might exploit
the Mill–Ramsey–Lewis account of laws to pick out a preferred genidentity relation in favourable
cases. (For a comprehensive discussion of arguments concerning rotating homogeneous matter
in the context of the perdurantists–endurantist debate, see Buttereld 2004.) Now we can envisage
two spatio–temporal Humeanmosaics for which theMill–Ramsey–Lewis prescription yields prob-
abilistic laws involving Maxwell–Boltzman and Bose–Einstein statistics respectively. As described
in the paragraph above, the former favours a law formulated in terms of persisting particulars.
However, there will be many ways of drawing the lines of persistence consistent with the statistics.
Here is a case, then, where the simplest law favours introducing a genidentity relation, but fails to
determine which particle stages should be regarded as genidentical.
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relativity, quantum particles cannot be thought of as individuated by the relational
structures in which they are imbricated. ¿ey are not even reexively dened en-
tities.
9 TwoMorals for Quantum Gravity.
In the previous two sections two conclusions were reached concerning identical
particles in quantum mechanics. ¿e rst was that, since the states of identical
particle quantum mechanics were permutation invariant, there could be no ana-
logue of the hole argument that involved them. To run an analogue of the hole
argument one needs solutions of a permutation invariant theory that are not them-
selves permutation invariant and which are thus interpretable, at least in principle,
as representing physically distinct (although only haecceitistically distinct) states
of aairs. ¿e second, more tentative, conclusion, was that if a theory involves a
non-commutative algebra of observables, then there is at least a prima facie prob-
lem facing those who would interpret the ontology of the theory as involving a
single, determinate set of reexively dened entities.
Both of these conclusions would appear to be applicable to loop quantum grav-
ity (LQG), the rst straightforwardly so. ¿e states of loop quantum gravity satisfy
the so-called dieomorphismconstraint. ¿ismeans that they are (3-)diffeomorph-
ism invariant: the states do not distinguish the points of the 3-manifold in terms
of which they are, notionally, dened. In LQG the points of the spatial 3-manifold
have a status exactly analogous to particle labels in identical particle quantumme-
chanics.48
¿e space of states that satisfy both the Gauss constraint and the dieomor-
phism constraint is spanned by a basis of states that are labelled by abstract spin
networks, or knots, where a knot is an equivalence class of graphs embedded in a
manifold under dieomorphisms. It is to these states (o en, and somewhat confus-
ingly, also referred to simply as spin network states) that popular accounts of LQG
typically refer (see Rovelli 2001, pp. 110–1). ¿e nodes of the graph can be thought
of as quanta of volume—as elementary chunks of space—and the links as quanta of
area separating these volumes. ¿is picture suggests the following thought: might
we regard the links and nodes of abstract spin networks as representing genuine
48Dean Rickles (2005) suggests that an analogue of the hole argument can be constructed in
the context of LQG. ¿e states involved in his construction are spin network states that solve the
Gauss constraint but which do not solve the dieomorphism constraint (or the Hamiltonian con-
straint). ¿ey are therefore not solutions of the (quantum) Einstein equations. To claim, therefore,
that “Einstein’s equation cannot determine where spin-networks are in the manifold” is mislead-
ing. Einstein’s equation (or rather its quantum version) determines exactly where on the manifold a
spin network is: it is smeared all over themanifold in a dieomorphic-invariant fashion. See Pooley
(forthcoming).
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entities (i.e., elementary volumes and surfaces of space), entities that are reexively
dened by the network of relations in which they stand?
¿e obvious worry with this proposal concerns the second conclusion men-
tioned above. ¿e spin network basis is just one basis for the space of states that
satisfy the Gauss constraint. Other possible bases will provide us with a set of states
that are not interpretable as networks of volumes and areas (the volume and area
operators will not be diagonalized by these other bases). If non-commuting ob-
servables do not allow quantum particles to be straightforwardly interpreted as
reexively dened objects, the same will be true of the elementary quanta of loop
quantum gravity.
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